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Environmental Exposures in 
the U.S. Electric Utility Industry 
Robert Repetto and James Henderson 
Abstract 
Keywords (electric utilities, environment, disclosure) 
Quantitative analysis of 47 U.S. electric utilities’ environmental exposures to 
impending air quality and climate policies shows potentially material and highly
differentiated financial impacts. For many companies, the minimized compliance costs
of a four-pollutant cap-and-trade regulatory regime would not necessarily exceed
those of a three-pollutant regime that omitted controls on carbon dioxide emissions.
Fragmented regulatory requirements would have the highest compliance costs. The
companies studied vary considerably in the adequacy of their financial reporting of
these potential impacts. Greater transparency would benefit investors and the most
favorably positioned companies. 
summary and methodology 
The electric utility industry is one of the most environmentally sensitive sectors of the 
U.S. economy. Most companies with generating assets are heavily exposed to the 
impacts of environmental regulations. Not only have utilities spent heavily to comply 
with past and current environmental standards, most are faced with the likelihood of 
significant additional expenditures to meet future environmental standards now 
being considered by Congress and regulatory agencies. Among the most significant of 
these are additional restrictions on emissions of nitrogen and sulfur oxides, airborne 
particulates, mercury and other toxic air pollutants, as well as new restrictions on 
emissions of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas. Depending on the outcomes 
of legislative and regulatory processes now underway, utilities may be subject to 
expensive new requirements. Consequently, environmental issues are well-known 
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material financial uncertainties and a crucial management challenge for most com­
panies in the utility sector. Environmental exposures are also sources of potential 
competitive advantage or disadvantage for most utilities. The financial risks that 
result from environmental exposures are highly differentiated across companies in 
the sector. 
This variability stems from differences in: 
●	 the importance of generating earnings in total earnings, the mix of tech­












In deregulated wholesale electricity markets, particularly, generating units will not 
be assured of recovering environmental control costs through rate increases. 
Companies will differ in their ability to recover costs, depending on the regulatory 
status of the plants they operate and the market position of those plants. 
A challenge for management in this sector is to position companies to prosper 
despite the uncertainties surrounding these impending environmental issues. This 
involves not only managing asset portfolios to maximize risk-adjusted returns, but 
also participating strategically in the public policy process and ensuring that the 
financial community understands and appreciates company strategies. The results of 
this paper show how complicated these challenges are. According to our analysis, 
companies within the utilities sector would rationally take differing public policy 
positions and adopt different investment strategies to deal with impending environ­
mental issues. 
Because these issues are definitely material, a thorough understanding of the 
financial implications of electric utilities’ environmental exposures is necessary if the 
investment community is to assess accurately the risks and values in utility company 
securities. Financial impacts can be sufficiently large to have significant effects on 
earnings, credit risk, asset valuations, and fundamental shareholder values. 
The analysis presented in this paper compares, in financial terms, the environ­
mental exposures of leading electric utility holding companies, under a range of plau­
sible future environmental policy scenarios concerning carbon dioxide and other 
important air pollutants, most notably sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and mercury. 
The results confirm that these policy issues constitute material financial uncertainties 
for most companies in the industry. 
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The results also indicate that for most companies, under plausible assumptions,
dealing with all four pollutants in an integrated way would be less costly than delaying
the control of carbon emissions until steps to control the other pollutants had already
been taken. Moreover, somewhat counter-intuitively, the results suggest that an
integrated policy that required reductions in all four emissions might be less costly for
many electric utilities than a policy that exempted carbon emissions from controls
altogether. This finding, if accurate, means that companies face interesting challenges
in formulating their positions on regulatory policy issues. 
The analytic tool, or “metric” underlying these results embodies a methodology 
that could be adopted both by financial analysts and by utility sector managers. It 
estimates the least-cost option to comply with current and pending air quality 
regulations for each of 47 large utility holding companies. The least cost option is the 
minimized, discounted present value of adopting least-cost controls on all generating 
units owned by each utility holding company to bring them into compliance. The 
compliance options include a suite of combustion controls, post-combustion 
pollution controls, re-powering with a cleaner fuel, and permit trading. Available 
compliance options and associated costs are tailored to the specific technological 
characteristics of each generating unit, and take into account pollution control 
equipment already installed. Least-cost combinations of emissions controls and 
permit trading are derived by minimizing discounted estimated capital and operating 
costs over a twenty-five year horizon. 
This metric was used in this study to analyze the following scenarios: 
●	 the financial impacts of a three-pollutant cap-and-trade bill that imposes 
stricter future controls on emissions of nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, and 
mercury; 
●	 a four-pollutant cap-and-trade bill that adds restrictions on future
 
emissions of carbon dioxide;
 
●	 a third hybrid scenario constructed on the assumption that controls on
 
carbon emissions would be announced belatedly, after decisions to
 




These policy scenarios were chosen to resemble proposed legislation submitted to 
the current and previous Congresses. Financial impacts were estimated under the 
assumption that permits would initially be grandfathered to utilities in proportion to 
their historical 1998 emissions, and under an alternative assumption, that permits 
would be allocated through an auction among utility bidders. In total, therefore, six 
policy scenarios were analyzed. 
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1 In order to overcome these 
limitations, a complete model 
of the demand and supply 
sides of electricity markets is 
being constructed, in which 
environmental cost increases 
lead companies to alter the 
quantities and prices at which 
power from various generat­
ing units is bid into the mar­
ket. This model is applicable 
to regulated and deregulated 
electricity markets. In this 
model, an econometrically 
estimated bid function aggre­
gates estimated bids into an 
overall market supply curve. 
The model simulates the 
action of an ISO in matching 
supply with market demand 
in all periods, thereby deter­
mining the market clearing 
price as well as the electricity 
supplied by each unit. 
Simulations run over future 
time periods yield operating 
earnings for all units, which 
vary in each environmental 
policy scenario. 
Beyond these six specific policy scenarios, the metric is an analytical tool that 
permits wide flexibility in the choice of policy assumptions. Analysts can pre-specify 
the allowance levels and percentage emission reductions, the compliance deadlines, 
the amortization period, the permit prices prevailing for each pollutant in each five-
year period, and the discount rate to be applied, and thereby can quickly generate 
financial cost information under resulting scenarios. 
In order to facilitate comparison of environmental exposures among companies, 
the present value of future compliance costs in constant year 2000 prices, discounted 
at 8% per year to the year 2000, are benchmarked to each company’s revenues in the 
year 2000. These benchmarks indicate the financial materiality of the companies’ 
environmental exposures to pending environmental issues and allow their exposures 
to be compared. Two limitations of this analysis should be recognized. First, the 
approach does not allow for adjustments by companies in the dispatch of their 
various generating units in order to achieve compliance. In reality, companies may 
reduce the hours operated by particular units rather than install pollution control 
equipment if the former is the least-cost option. Second, the metric does not allow for 
the fact that companies may recover some or all of their environmental costs if 
market or regulatory processes pass through these cost increases to electricity product 
prices. Because these adjustment modes are not included in the metric, the resulting 
cost increases overstate the financial impacts of the environmental scenarios relative 
to revenues and earnings.1 However, financially material costs of compliance with 
environmental regulations, such as those estimated through this methodology, must 
be disclosed in financial statements under current securities laws without netting 
these costs against possible future cost recovery. 
analytical details
A Three-Pollutant Cap-and-Trade Policy 
The metric analyzes a three-pollutant cap-and-trade policy that approximates the 
Bush Administration’s “Clear Skies” policy. The hypothesized policy requires utilities 
to reduce emissions of sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and mercury by 75%, 75%, and 
90% respectively below emissions in the baseline year of 1997. The assumed date by 
which compliance must be achieved is the year 2008. In that year, in the scenario 
assuming grandfathering of emission allowances, if electricity production and fuel 
use grow at assumed rates, allowed emissions for generating plants would be 
0.190818 pounds of sulfur oxide per million BTUs of energy consumed, and 
0.090248 pounds of nitrogen oxide per million BTUs of energy. These allowances 
represent the “caps” in the cap-and-trade regime. In the analysis assuming that emis­
sion permits would be auctioned in the year 2008, these allowances can be exceeded 
by purchasing permits but, in the aggregate, only enough permits are put up for sale 
to meet the overall emission reduction requirement. 
It is assumed in this analysis that all generating plants would be eligible to trade 
emission allowances for sulfur and nitrogen oxides in a national emission trading 
market but that an emission trading market for mercury would not exist, due 
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principally to monitoring difficulties. The prices in these permit markets in the 
three-pollutant and four-pollutant announced later scenarios for sulfur oxides and 
nitrogen oxides are assumed to be $US303 per ton and $US1619 per ton respectively 
during the period 2008-2014 and subsequently in the period 2014-2035. In the other 
four-pollutant scenario the permit prices in the period 2008-2014 are assumed to be 
$936 per ton and $254 per ton for nitrogen and sulfur oxides, respectively. These 
prices are not estimated within the metric model but are adopted from analyses 
carried out with the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS).2 This system 
represents, with a higher degree of aggregation, the U.S. electricity sector as a whole 
and derives estimates of electricity, fuel, and permit prices from simulated demand 
and supply balances. 
In addition to allowance trading, the analysis assumes that generating units can 
draw from an array of internal pollution control options. Utilities are assumed to 
make compliance choices to be compatible with existing installed technology in 
order to achieve technologically possible and cost-effective compliance. The capital 
and operating costs for each of these options, as applied to plants of given charac­
teristics, were estimated from the literature as of 1998. The options included in the 
analysis, including technical options for reducing carbon dioxide emissions, are: 
Combustion controls, such as: 
● Low NOx burner with or without overfire air; 
● Low NOx coal-and-air nozzles with close coupled overfire air; 
● Low NOx coal-and-air nozzles with separated overfire air; 
● Low NOx coal-and-air nozzles with close-coupled and separated overfire air; 
● Coal reburning; 
● NOx combustion controls for wet bottom boiler types; 
● NOx combustion controls for vertically fired boiler types; 
● Non plug-in combustion controls. 
Post-combustion controls, such as: 
●	 Selective catalytic reduction (SCR) for low or high NOx rate and for coal 
or gas/oil stream boilers; 
●	 Selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR) for low or high NOx rate and
 
for coal or gas/oil stream boilers;
 
Scrubbers: 
●	 Scrubbers for 1%, 2%, 3%, or 4% sulfur content in the fuel, by weight; 
Combined Controls, such as: 
●	 SCR and scrubber for low or high NOx rate; 
●	 SNCR and scrubber for low NOx rate; 
Maximum Available Control Technologies (MACT) for mercury emission control,
according to the particular boiler type 
2 Energy Information 
Administration, 2000, 
Analysis of Strategies for 
Reducing Multiple Emissions 
from Power Plants: Sulfur 
Dioxide, Nitrogen Oxides, and 
Carbon Dioxide, Office of 
Integrated Analysis and 
Forecasting, U.S. Dept. of 
Energy, December. 
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Re-powering for carbon dioxide emission control: 
● From coal to coal IGCC; 
● From coal to gas combined cycle; 
● From oil/gas to gas combined cycle; 
● From fossil fuel to wind power; 
Each generating plant was assumed to use the most cost-effective combination of 
internal controls and permit purchases to meet the pollution constraints jointly. In 
these estimates, capital and operating costs were discounted at an 8% annual com­
pound rate. Plants that were able to meet emission caps purely through internal con­
trols at costs per ton less than the assumed market price of emission permits were 
assumed to generate emission reductions in excess of their requirements for sale in 
permit markets. Revenues from such sales were subtracted from compliance costs for 
such units. 
A Four-Pollutant Cap-and-Trade Policy 
The metric was also applied to analyze the impacts of a four-pollutant cap-and-trade 
policy regime in which generating units are required to reduce carbon dioxide emis­
sions 7% below 1990 levels by the year 2015 in addition to the emission reductions for 
sulfur, nitrogen, and mercury described above. The analysis assumed that the re-pow­
ering options mentioned above represent the technological options for reducing car­
bon dioxide emissions, and that the industry would be aware of the future carbon 
abatement requirement at the same time that the other emission caps were 
announced. The costs of the four-pollutant regime were analyzed both with the 
assumption that carbon permits would be grandfathered and with the assumption 
that they would be distributed by auction. In the former case, the applicable emission 
cap for each generating unit in 2015 was assumed to be 92.309208 pounds of carbon 
dioxide per million BTUs. 
Adhering to results from the NEMS analysis, it was assumed that over the period 
2015-2035 the prevailing price in the carbon dioxide permit market would be $US32 
per ton, which implies approximately $US100 per ton of carbon. This is consistent 
with analyses assuming no international trading in carbon permits. In addition, it has 
been assumed in the four-pollutant cap-and-trade policy that prices for sulfur and 
nitrogen oxide permits would fall to $254 and $936 per ton respectively in the period 
after 2015. The reason for this assumption is that so many units would re-power to 
natural gas fuel to meet the carbon constraint, reducing sulfur and nitrogen emis­
sions in the process, that the overall emission constraints for sulfur and nitrogen 
oxides would be met without additional expenditures on combustion or post-com­
bustion controls. For that reason, the demand for permits would fall to negligible lev­
els in those markets. With respect to mercury, the cost-effectiveness analysis estimat­
ed the avoided cost of mercury MACT controls to be $US72, 500 per pound of mer­
cury when calculating the net cost of re-powering to gas, which has a much lower mer­
cury content than coal. 
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simulation results 
The Three-Pollutant Cap-and-Trade Policy 
If a three-pollutant cap-and-trade policy similar to that endorsed by the current U.S. 
administration and submitted in proposed legislation is adopted, many large U.S. 
electric utility holding companies will face significant financial impacts.3 This is true 
whether permits are initially auctioned or distributed (grandfathered) in relation to his­
torical emissions. The required cuts in emissions would be sufficiently large to ensure 
that utilities would be forced to install expensive internal controls and that permit 
prices in an allowance trading market would remain high, although a significant frac­
tion of units would adopt re-powering to natural gas fuel as the least-cost option. 


































3 These financial impacts 
would not necessarily exceed 
those if instead of a cap-and­
trade regime the EPA 
implemented the various 
piecemeal regulations now in 
various stages of enactment. 
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Utilities from Most to Least Exposed 
Figure 1 illustrates the finding that, even if permits are initially distributed free to 
companies in proportion to their historical emissions, more than half of the 47 major 
utility holding companies included in the study would face compliance costs with a 
discounted present value greater than 10% of their total year 2000 revenues. Over a 
quarter would face costs in excess of 20% of year 2000 revenues. Total revenues 
include not only revenues from sales of generated electricity, but also revenues from 
distribution, transmission, and unrelated business activities. Two electricity compa­
nies would face discounted compliance costs greater than 40% of their year 2000 rev­
enues. To put these magnitudes into perspective, operating profits among these com­
panies average only 4 or 5% of operating revenues. 
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Utilities from Most to Least Exposed 
Figure 2 demonstrates that if permits are not distributed free but are sold to utili­
ties through competitive auctions, these companies’ financial exposures would be 
even greater. About one-third of the companies in the sample would face discounted 
compliance costs greater than 20% of their total year 2000 revenues, but two of the 
companies would be exposed to the extent of 50% or more of those revenues. For all 
but a few companies, the possibility of a future three-pollutant cap-and-trade policy 
represents a significant, financially material future risk. 
The other striking conclusion that emerges from Figures 1 and 2 is the fact that dif­
ferent companies within the electric power sector are exposed in markedly differing 
degrees to future environmental restrictions of this kind. For a handful of companies, 
discounted compliance costs would amount to a small percentage of revenues, and 
for one or two companies, compliance costs would be negligible. At the other 
extreme, for some companies the potential compliance costs would be extremely 
large relative to annual revenues. The differing environmental exposures of compa­
nies within the same sector represent significant sources of competitive advantage or 
disadvantage. 
Differences in exposure to impending environmental restrictions could stem from 
several factors that reflect past investment decisions: 
●	 The importance of generating revenues in total revenues; 




●	 The effectiveness of emission controls already in place; 






   
 
   
   
 



























●	 The ease of retrofitting additional emission controls onto existing plants. 
In an environmentally sensitive sector such as electricity generation, a company’s 
decisions with respect to environmental performance can put it in a favorable or 
unfavorable competitive position to face emerging environment issues. These com­
petitive advantages or disadvantages can be significant with respect to a company's 
overall business position. 
The reason why forcing companies to purchase permits at auction instead of 
receiving them free would not greatly increase the financial burden of a three-pollu­
tant cap-and-trade policy is that there are few permits to be distributed under these 
scenarios. The percentage reductions in emissions assumed in these simulations are 
so large that few permits would be available for distribution. Therefore, the addition­
al expenditures on purchased permits would not be a major cost element. 
The Four-Pollutant Cap-and-Trade Policy 
The simulation results representing the impacts of a four-pollutant cap-and-trade 
policy show striking differences compared to the three-pollutant results. Figure 3 
shows that under a requirement that carbon emissions be reduced 7% below a 1990 
baseline, with a compliance deadline of 2015, and if permits were grandfathered to 
utilities, then under the assumptions of the scenario, compliance costs would be 
lower than in the three pollutant scenarios. This is quite counterintuitive because 
adding an additional environmental requirement should normally be expected to 
raise costs, not lower them. The explanation lies in the assumed carbon permit price. 
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If it is as high as $US32 per ton of carbon ($US100 per ton of CO2), utilities that re-
power to natural gas would make considerable money selling excess carbon permits, 
since re-powering would reduce carbon emissions by far more than necessary to meet 
the requirement. Comparing Figure 3 with Figures 1 and 2 indicates that for most util­
ities, net compliance costs would actually be lower with an integrated four-pollutant 
regime, if permits were grandfathered. Once the carbon permit price reaches a level 
at which it becomes economical to re-power a unit, further increases in the price pro­
vide revenues from permit sales to the company that offset compliance costs. 
Moreover, in reducing carbon dioxide emissions by switching plants to run on nat­
ural gas, companies will avoid the need to install expensive equipment to control 
emissions of mercury, sulfur, and (to some extent) nitrogen emissions. Since the nat­
ural sulfur or mercury content of natural gas used as power plant fuel is low, switch­
ing to natural gas not only reduces carbon emissions, it also, as a side benefit, helps 
meet other emission constraints. In fact, adding a carbon constraint would induce so 
many companies to make the fuel switch that the prices of nitrogen and sulfur per­
mits would fall precipitously. 
Companies differ greatly in their exposures to a four-pollutant regime. The distri­
bution of compliance costs does not differ greatly from that found in the three-pol­
lutant scenario, although individual companies change places in the ranking. Overall, 
the general conclusions remain the same. For most companies, the prospect of a four-
pollutant cap-and- trade policy that includes carbon constraints represents a materi­
al financial risk and a potential source of competitive advantage or disadvantage. 
If carbon permits are sold by auction, however, then these conclusions must be 
revised, as shown in Figure 4. If the permit price per ton of carbon dioxide were 








































Utilities from Most to Least Exposed 








 11    
$US32 per ton, in line with many economic model predictions, power plants produce 
such prodigious amounts of carbon dioxide that the total costs of acquiring the nec­
essary permits at auction would be very large. For three-quarters of the companies, 
the discounted compliance cost would exceed 20% of a year’s revenues. For half the 
companies, the costs would exceed 40% of a year’s revenues. At the extreme, for the 
most exposed companies, discounted compliance costs would be nearer to one year’s 
total revenues. 
Again, not only do these exposures create material financial risks, they also create 
powerful potential competitive advantages and disadvantages. One or two companies 
face negative compliance costs in some scenarios because of their potential revenue 
gains in selling permits. More broadly, for some companies with relatively small com­
pliance burdens, profits would likely increase as electricity prices rose in response to 
higher industry operating costs. 
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Utilities from Most to Least Exposed 
Figures 5 and 6 show that for most companies, the worst of all worlds would be one in
which they make least-cost decisions to comply with a three-pollutant cap-and-trade
policy regime but are then faced, a few years later, with a new carbon reduction cli­
mate requirement. The ability to defer carbon control expenditures would not make up
for the wasted costs of pollution control equipment for the other three pollutants and
the loss of potential revenues from selling excess carbon permits. The costs of dealing
with this situation would be higher for most companies than the costs of dealing with
an integrated four-pollutant cap-and-trade regime. 
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Utilities from Most to Least Exposed 
Table I illustrates the importance of the strategic choices facing electric utility 
companies by presenting the favored least-cost compliance options under all three 
scenarios, expressed as a percentage of total generating capacity (of all companies) 
choosing particular options. For example, the first panel of the table shows that under 
a 3-pollutant cap-and-trade regime, all of the capacity would respond by adopting 
some combination of combustion and post-combustion emission controls and per­
mit transactions. By contrast, the second panel shows that under a 4-pollutant 
regime, 70% of the total capacity would achieve compliance by re-powering to natu­
ral gas plus permit transactions, instead of adopting combustion or post-combustion 
controls. For those units, limiting conventional pollutants along with carbon emis­
sions would be achieved by changing the fuel. 
The final panel illustrates the dilemma created by uncertainty over the direction of 
climate policy. If companies responded to a 3-pollutant regime by adopting their 
least-cost compliance options, but subsequently faced an unforeseen restriction on 
carbon emissions, almost 65% would re-power to natural gas, even though they had 
previously invested in combustion and post-combustion control technology to limit 
conventional pollutants. This indicates a wasted expenditure, because, with foresight, 
such units would simply have re-powered as the least-cost compliance option and 
would not have had to spend money on other measures. This is one reason why an 
integrated 4-pollutant policy would be the most economical for many companies. 
Therefore, company managers face important decisions about the best way to 
position their companies to deal with these impending environmental scenarios and 
also about the best stance to take in the public policy arena. For many, resisting con­
trols on carbon emissions may not be in their own best interest. 
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Table I	 Strategies Adopted to Comply with the Scenarios as a Percent of Total Generating Capacity:
Compliance Strategies as a Percent of Total Generating Capacity, All Companies 
Three-Pollutant Cap-and-Trade Scenarios 
Compliance Strategy Percent of Generation 
Combustion/Post Combustion Controls + Permits 
Mercury Controls + Permits 
39.0 
3.2 
Comb/Post Comb + Mercury Controls + Permits 45.2 
No Controls + Permits 12.6 
Four-Pollutant Cap-and-Trade Scenarios with Integrated Carbon Controls 
Compliance Strategy Percent of Generation 
Combustion/Post Combustion + Permits 17.1 
Re-powering + Permits 70.1 
Mercury + Permits 0.4 
Comb/Post Comb + Mercury + Permits 0.2 
No Controls + Permits 12.3 
Four-Pollutant Cap-and-Trade Scenarios with Carbon Requirements Announced Later 
Compliance Strategy Percent of Generation 
Combustion/Post Combustion Controls + Permits 19.1 
Re-powering + Permits 0.3 
Mercury Controls + Permits 0.4 
Re-powering + Comb/Post Comb Controls +Permits 19.8 
Comb/Post Comb + Mercury Controls + Permits 0.2 
Re-powering + Mercury Controls + Permits 2.9 
Mercury + Comb/PostComb Controls + 
Re-powering + Permits 45.0 
No Controls + Permits 12.3 
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implications for financial analysts and investors 
The environmental policy scenarios used in this application of the metric tool are 
neither implausible nor remote. Legislation enacting both three-pollutant and four-
pollutant cap-and-trade policies has been introduced in the current and previous 
Congressional sessions. The three-pollutant approach has the endorsement of the 
current administration. 
Because companies’ financial exposures to these policies are so significant and so 
different, potential investors and financial analysts should be aware of the potential 
implications. Enactment of such policies could materially affect earnings, liquidity, 
debt-servicing capacity, required capital expenditures, and other financial character­
istics. Because of the financial importance of these issues, it is not just managers of 
environmentally screened or socially responsible assets who should have an interest 
in knowing more about companies’ exposures. Mainstream financial analysts could 
also benefit from greater transparency. 
Many financial analysts assume that they can infer electric utility companies’ expo­
sures to these environmental issues, even without detailed compliance cost informa­
tion, simply by referring to simple indicators, such as the importance of coal in a 
company’s fuel mix. To test this assumption, multiple regression analyses were carried 
out for the sample of 47 companies relating compliance costs as a percentage of total 
company revenues to the following publicly available indicators: the percentage of 
coal in each company’s fuel mix, the percentage of generating revenues in each com­
pany’s total revenues, and the (generation-weighted) average age of each company’s 
generating units. If companies’ exposures to these environmental scenarios are pre­
dictable in terms of such simple indicators, then the regression analyses should yield 
a high multiple correlation coefficient (which indicates the percentage of total sam­
ple variation that can be explained). 
In fact, the regression analyses resulted in surprisingly low multiple correlation 
coefficients: 
●	 For the 3 pollutant scenario with allowances grandfathered, the coefficient 
was 0.23; 
●	 For the 4-pollutant scenario with allowances grandfathered, the coeffi­
cient was 0.10;
 




These findings imply that simple benchmarking indicators are likely to give a 
misleading prediction of companies’ exposures. Without more detailed information 
on the compliance options available to each generating unit and their costs, analysts 
will not be able to predict accurately how each electricity company will be impacted. 
Therefore, investors are quite dependent on the companies themselves for 
information on the potential financial impacts of these impending environmental 
restrictions. 
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At this point few companies in the sample have disclosed in their financial reports 
the implications of proposed three-pollutant or four-pollutant cap-and-trade poli­
cies, particularly in any quantitative detail. Although some companies have provided 
fuller disclosure than others, a perusal of SEC filings would be of little help to 
investors and analysts in understanding the distribution of exposures of electric util­
ity companies to the risks of this kind of environmental legislation. This lack of infor­
mation exists despite current SEC regulations requiring companies to disclose “mate­
rial events and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported finan­
cial information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating results or future 
financial condition.” (Item 303, Regulation S-K, 17CFR229.303) 
The SEC’s instructions to firms on how to comply with this regulation in the man­
agement discussion and analysis (MD&A) section of their financial reports specifies 
that registered companies shall disclose “where a trend, demand, commitment, event, 
or uncertainty is both presently known to management and reasonably likely to have 
material effects on the registrant’s financial condition or results of operation.” (SEC 
Release 33-6835, May 24, 1989; 54FR22427). In the case of a proposed government reg­
ulation, the registrant is required to make two determinations in deciding what to 
disclose. First, it must determine that there is not a reasonable likelihood that the reg­
ulation or provision will be enacted. If it cannot make that determination, it must 
disclose the impacts on the firm's financial conditions under the assumption that the 
law or regulation will be adopted, unless it can make a second determination that, if 
enacted, the provisions will not have a material financial effect. 
In the case of the three-pollutant or four-pollutant policies, most firms in the elec­
tric utility sector would find it difficult to reach the conclusion that the provisions, if 
enacted, would have no material financial effect. Moreover, bipartisan legislation has 
once again been introduced in the Congress imposing requirements similar to those 
described in this paper. Nonetheless, there is currently little information in many 
companies’ financial reports regarding these issues. Moreover, there is little evidence 
that companies with the least exposures have tried to set a higher standard of trans­
parency for the industry, although it would seem to be in their interest to do so. No 
systematic differences in the completeness of disclosure are evident between the 
reports of the least and most exposed companies. Investors and many electric utility 
companies share an interest in greater transparency with regard to these impending 
environmental requirements. 
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electric utility holding companies
included in the study
Allegheny Energy, Inc Entergy Corporation RGS Energy Group Inc 
AES Corp Exelon Corporation SCANA Corporation 
ALLETE FirstEnergy Corporation Sierra Pacific Resources 
Alliant Energy Corp FPL Group, Inc Southern Company, The 
Ameren Corp Great River Energy TECO Energy, Inc 
American Electric Power Co Inc IDACORP Inc TXU Corporation 
CH Energy Group, Inc KeySpan Corp UniSource Energy Corporation 
Cinergy Corp LG&E Energy Corporation Vectren Corporation 
CLECO Corporation Niagara Mohawk Holdings Inc. Wisconsin Energy Corporation 
CMS Energy Corporation NiSource, Inc WPS Resources Corporation 
Conectiv Northeast Utilities Xcel Energy Inc 
Constellation Energy Group, Inc OGE Energy Corporation 
Dominion Resources, Inc PG&E Corporation 
DPL Inc Pinnacle West Capital 
Corporation 
DTE Energy Company PPL Corp 
Duke Energy Corporation Progress Energy 
Dynegy Inc Public Service Enterprise 
Group, Inc 
Edison International Reliant Energy, Inc 
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